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Abstract
Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory explains how the appearance of purpo-
sive design in the sophisticated adaptations of living organisms can have
come about without their intentionally being designed. The explanation re-
lies crucially on the possibility of certain physical processes: mainly, gene
replication and natural selection.
In this paper I show that for those processes to be possible without the
design of biological adaptations being encoded in the laws of physics, those
laws must have certain other properties. The theory of what these properties
are is not part of evolution theory proper, and has not been developed, yet
without it the neo-Darwinian theory does not fully achieve its purpose of
explaining the appearance of design.
To this end I apply Constructor Theory’s new mode of explanation to provide
an exact formulation of the appearance of design, of no-design laws, and of the
logic of self-reproduction and natural selection, within fundamental physics.
I conclude that self-reproduction, replication and natural selection are possi-
ble under no-design laws, the only non-trivial condition being that they allow
digital information to be physically instantiated. This has an exact charac-
terisation in the constructor theory of information. I also show that under
no-design laws an accurate replicator requires the existence of a “vehicle”
constituting, together with the replicator, a self-reproducer.
1 Introduction
Living entities display regularities unlike those observed in any other kind
of matter in the universe. Although regular shapes of planets or crystals
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can be striking, these are explained by symmetries in the laws of physics; in
contrast, even modest organisms, such as bacteria, display stupendously de-
signed mechanisms, with many, different sub-parts coordinating to an overall
function; they perform transformations on physical systems with remarkable
accuracy, retaining their ability to do so again and again - just as if they had
literally been designed. This appearance of design was long considered evi-
dence of intentional design [1, 2, 3], and it does indeed require an explanation:
Why is it there? How did it come into existence?
The theory of evolution [4] explains how the appearance of design can have
been brought about by an undesigned physical process of variation and natu-
ral selection. It is a principle of the evolutionary theory that everything with
the appearance of design must have come into existence by natural selection -
directly (e.g. living organisms) or indirectly (objects that have literally been
designed, such as cars or robots).
In the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis [5, 6, 7], the centrepiece of the expla-
nation is a physical object - the replicator [5]: something that can be copied
from generation to generation, by replication, and selected (between a set
of variants) under the action of the environment. Instances of replicators in
the earth’s biosphere are “genes”, i.e., portions of certain DNA molecule.(1)
Natural selection relies on gene replication, with occasional errors; the ap-
pearance of design is explained as adaptations for gene replication across
generations; and the rest of the cell or organism (and sometimes other parts
of the environment, e.g. nests, [6]) constitutes a vehicle for the replicators.
Thus the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution relies on the laws of physics to
permit replication and the processes essential to the latter – including, as
I shall explain, self-reproduction. Therefore, for the theory to explain fully
the appearance of design in the biosphere, it is essential that those processes
be possible under laws of physics that do not contain the design of biological
adaptations - which I shall call no-design laws.(2)
In this paper I show that those physical processes are indeed possible, pro-
vided that those laws have certain other properties. Although the theory of
what these properties are does not belong to evolutionary theory proper, the
neo-Darwinian theory cannot fully explain the appearance of design without
(1)Subtleties about what portion of the genome is a gene, what is selection, and at what
level it occurs, are not relevant for the present discussion and will therefore be ignored. It
will suffice restricting attention to the logic of natural selection only.
(2)For a discussion of how no-design laws differ from generically fine-tuned laws, or bio-
friendly laws, as in [8], see section 3.2.
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it.(3)
To explain why, we need to examine more precisely the physical processes
central to the theory of evolution. A replicator is an object R that is capable
of undergoing replication (i.e., being copied), as in this schematic pattern:
C
NR R R W
C is the copier, acting on some raw material N (possibly producing waste
products W ); in living entities the copier is included in the cell - whose
self-reproduction is thus essential to gene replication over many generations.
A self-reproducer is an object S capable of undergoing the physical transfor-
mation
NS S S W 
where the raw materials N need not contain the means to create another S,
and the whole system could be isolated. For present purposes it suffices to
model the logic of self-reproduction only as it occurs in early life and pre-life -
for instance, sexual reproduction need not be modelled and the environment
can be assumed to be non-biological.
In that context the difference between a replicator and a self-reproducer is
that the latter does not rely on any mechanism other than itself and the
laws of physics to cause the construction of the new instance, whereas a
replicator depends on a copying mechanism outside itself. As I shall explain,
under no-design laws this implies that an accurate self-reproducer consists of
a “vehicle” and a replicator, and its self-reproduction occurs by copying the
replicator and re-constructing the vehicle afresh. This “replicator-vehicle”
logic (see section 3.2) was discovered by von Neumann, [9], and its relevance
in biology thoroughly analysed in [7], [10].
(3)The term “life” in the title is just a shorthand to refer to all those processes that the
theory of evolution relies upon to explain “life” on earth. (It will not be necessary here to
define “life” more precisely than that.)
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In the biosphere self-reproduction is approximated to various accuracies.
There are many poor approximations to self-reproducers - e.g., crude repli-
cators such as crystals, short RNA strands and autocatalytic cycles involved
in the origin of life [11]. Being so inaccurate, they do not require any further
explanation under no-design laws: they do not have appearance of design,
any more than simple inorganic catalysts do.(4)
In contrast, actual gene-replication is an impressively accurate physical trans-
formation, albeit imperfect. But even more striking is that living cells can
self-reproduce to high accuracy in a variety of environments, reconstruct-
ing the vehicle afresh, under the control of the genes, in all the intricate
details necessary for gene replication. This is prima facie problematic un-
der no-design laws: how can those processes be so accurate, without their
design being encoded in the laws of physics? This is why some physicists
- notably, Wigner and Bohm, [12], [13] - have even claimed that accurate
self-reproduction of an organism with the appearance of design requires the
laws of motion to be “tailored” for the purpose – i.e., they must contain its
design [12].
These claims, stemming from the tradition of incredulity that living enti-
ties can be scientifically explained, [14], highlight a problem. The theory of
evolution must be supplemented by a theory that those physical processes
upon which it relies are provably compatible with no-design laws of physics.
No such theory has been proposed; and those claims have not been properly
refuted.
Indeed, the central problem here – i.e., whether and under what circum-
stances accurate self-reproduction and replication are compatible with no-
design laws – is awkward to formulate in the prevailing conception of fun-
damental physics, which expresses everything in terms of predictions given
some initial conditions and laws of motion.
This mode of explanation can only approximately express emergent notions
such as the appearance of design, no-design laws, etc.
Von Neumann, who attempted to investigate self-reproduction within this
framework, got as far as discovering its essential (replicator-vehicle) logic,
[9]. However his use of the prevailing conception forced his analysis to be in
terms of predictions: thus he attempted without success to provide the design
of an actual self-reproducer in terms of atoms and microscopic interaction.
(4) The very existence of catalysts might be a sign of fine-tuning in the laws of physics,
but not fine-tuning for biological adaptations, with which we are concerned here.
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He finally produced a viable toy model, [15], within cellular automata, but
at the cost of severing the connections with actual physics. That model is
thus inadequate to address the current problem - whether self-reproduction
is compatible with the actual laws of physics un-augmented by any design of
adaptations.
The prevailing conception also forces a misleading formulation of the prob-
lem, as: what initial conditions and laws of motion must (or must probably)
produce accurate replicators and self-reproducers (with some probability)?
But what is disputed is whether such entities are possible under no-design
laws.
More generally, it cannot express the very explanation provided by evolution-
ary theory – that living organisms can have come about without intentionally
being designed. It would have aimed at proving that they must occur, given
certain initial conditions and dynamical laws.
To overcome these problems I resort to a newly proposed theory of physics,
constructor theory. [16, 17, 18]. It provides a new mode of explanation,
expressing all laws as statements about which transformations are possible,
which are impossible and why.
This brings counterfactual statements into fundamental physics, which is
key to the solution. The explanation provided by the theory of evolution is
already constructor-theoretic: it is possible that the appearance of design has
been brought about without intentionally being designed; so is our problem:
are the physical processes essential to the theory of evolution - i.e., self-
reproduction, replication and natural selection - possible under no-design
laws?
I shall show that they are (in section 2-3) provided that those laws of physics
allow the existence of media that can instantiate (digital) information (plus
enough time and energy). Information has an exact physical characterisation
in the constructor theory of information [17].
I also show that under no-design laws an accurate self-reproducer requires an
accurate (i.e., high-fidelity) replicator, and vice versa. Thus, the replicator-
vehicle logic von Neumann envisaged is here shown to be necessary for accu-
rate self-reproduction to be possible under such laws. This provides physical
foundations for the relation between “metabolism” and replication (as de-
fined by Dyson, [10]). In addition, that vehicles are necessary to high-quality
replicators under our laws of physics (despite replicators being the conceptual
pillar of evolutionary theory), informs the current debate about the necessity
of organisms. The latter was recently doubted by Dawkins [19]: “ Just as life
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did not have to become multicellular [...] so living materials did not have to
become packaged into discrete, individual organisms [..] behaving as unitary,
purposeful agents. The only thing that is really fundamental to Darwinian
life is self-replicating, coded information - genes, in the terminology of life
on this planet.”.
Constructor Theory’s mode of explanation also delivers an exact physical
expression of the notions of the appearance of design, no-design laws, and of
the logic of self-reproduction and natural selection.(5)
Finally, Wigner’s argument implies that accurate self-reproduction is incom-
patible particularly with quantum theory, thus challenging its universality -
a claim that others, with different motivations, have also made [20, 21, 22]. I
shall demonstrate (in section 4) a quantum-mechanical (kinematical) model
of the logic of self-reproduction, updating von Neumann’s, thus rebutting
those claims. This, incidentally, clarifies how self-reproduction differs from
cloning a quantum state (which has occasionally caused some confusion [20]).
It also vindicates that self-reproduction - and even (possibly artificial) self-
reproducers employing quantum coherence - are compatible with quantum
theory.
2 The problem
I shall introduce constructor theory’s tools to re-formulate the problem in
constructor-theoretic terms.
Constructor theory is a new fundamental theory of physics. First, it pro-
vides a paradigm to express the other laws of physics, to be expressed solely
as statements about which transformations are possible, which are impossi-
ble and why. Guesses at those laws - e.g., current physical theories such as
general relativity and quantum mechanics - it calls subsidiary theories. In
addition, it also proposes new laws - principles - constraining the subsidiary
theories. Here it suffices to know that the principles are obeyed by all known
laws of physics, nor do they themselves contain the design of biological adap-
tations (see [16], [17]).
The properties of a physical system M are attributes, defined as sets of states
of M. We say that M (say, a collection of atoms) has the attribute X (say,
being a car, or a self-reproducer) if it is in any of the states in X.
(5)The model is intended to be faithful only insofar the logic is concerned. Most realistic
details of these processes are irrelevant to their logic, so they shall be neglected.
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Constructor theory’s main elements are tasks. A task T is the abstract
specification of a transformation
T = {x1 → y1, x2 → y2, . . . , xn → yn}
as a set of input/output pairs of attributes {xi}, {yi} of the substrates (the
physical systems being transformed).
Tasks form an algebra under parallel and serial composition, and are com-
posable into networks to form other tasks [17].
A physical system with some attribute C is a constructor, capable of
performing the task T if:
• whenever presented with the substrates with any of the legitimate input
attributes of T , C delivers it with the corresponding output attribute,
as follows:
Input attributes of substrates
C
=⇒ Output attributes of substrates,
where C and the substrates jointly constitute an isolated system;
• C retains the ability to do so again.
A task is impossible if it is forbidden by the laws of physics (e.g., building
a perpetual motion machine); otherwise, it is possible.
Under our laws of physics, only approximate constructors exist, e.g. catalysts
or robots. They have non-zero error rates and deteriorate with use. Hence,
that a task is possible means that the laws of physics impose no limit, short
of perfection, on how accurately it could be performed, nor on how well
objects capable of approximately performing it could retain their ability to
do so. The term “constructor” is a placeholder for the (infinite) sequence of
approximations to the ideal behaviour of a constructor.
Both replication and self-reproduction find an exact expression in constructor
theory. The replication of a set Σ of attributes of a system is the task⋃
X∈Σ
{(X,N)→ (X,X,W )} (1)
on the composite system M1 ⊕M2 of the source substrate (containing the
attribute to be copied) and the target substrates (onto which the attribute
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is copied). X ∈ Σ is an attribute of M1, being replicated; N some receptive
attribute of M2 and (X,W ) the output attribute, including waste products
W . For example, Σ could be a set of musical notes; or the set of alleles
(variants of a gene) or the set of nucleotides. (6)
Self-reproduction is a construction where the self-reproducer S is a con-
structor, for constructing another instance of itself given raw materials N
containing neither S nor constructors for S:
N
S
=⇒ (S,W ) (2)
allowing for waste products. S is the specification of all properties necessary
for (2) to occur, given the laws of physics.
No-design laws can be expressed exactly in constructor theory, too.
First, I define “generic resources” as substrates that exist in effectively
unlimited numbers. In the context of early life on this planet, these include
only elementary entities such as photons, water, simple catalysts and small
organic molecules.
It has sometimes been proposed that the very existence of laws of nature
constitutes a form of “design” in them, [23]. In contrast, for present pur-
poses no-design laws are those that do not contain the design of biological
adaptations - i.e., of what the theory of evolution aims at explaining: for
the problem here is whether the physical processes assumed by the theory of
evolution are possible under such laws.
Consequently I require no-design laws to satisfy these conditions:
• Generic resources can only perform a few tasks, only to a finite accu-
racy, called elementary tasks. These are physically simple and contain
no design (of biological adaptations). Familiar examples are sponta-
neous, approximately self-correcting chemical reactions, such as molecules
“snapping” into a catalysts regardless of any original small mismatch.
• No good approximation to a constructor for tasks that are non-elementary
can ever be produced by generic resources acting on generic resources
only.
Under no-design laws, the generic resources and the interactions available
in nature are allowed to contain only those approximate constructors that
(6)It is a set of objects that can be copied - not necessarily containing a set of control
instructions.
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unequivocally do not have the design of those very adaptations the theory
of evolution is required to explain.(7) Examples of laws that would violate
these conditions are: laws including accurate constructors, such as bacte-
ria, in the generic resources; laws with “copy-like” interactions, designed to
copy the configuration of atoms of a bacterium onto generic resources; laws
permitting spontaneous generation of a bacterium directly from generic re-
sources only; laws permitting only mutations that are systematically directed
to improvements in a certain environment.
The exact characterisation of no-design laws is a departure from the pre-
vailing conception - which can at most characterise them as being typical,
according to some measure, in the space of all laws. The latter is unsuit-
able for present purposes, as the choice of the measure is highly arbitrary.
Moreover, it is misleading: some laws that may be untypical under some
natural measure - such as the actual laws of physics, because of, say, lo-
cal interactions - need not contain the design of biological adaptations, thus
qualifying as no-design in this context. Furthermore, laws with the design
of biological adaptations are a proper subset of those laws that in the con-
text of anthropic fine tuning have been called “bio-friendly”: those having
features - such as local interactions, or special values of the fine-structure
constant, etc. - which, if slightly changed, would cause life as we know it
to be impossible. These features, though necessary to life, are not specific
to life: their variation would make impossible many other phenomena, non
specifically related to biological adaptations.
The problem can now be restated in constructor theory, as: are accurate
self-reproducers and replicators possible under no-design laws?
I shall prove that an accurate self-reproducer is possible under no-design laws,
provided they allow information to be physically instantiated; from this it
will follow that an accurate replicator is possible too, provided that it be
contained in a self-reproducer, (sections 3.1 - 3.3).
I will assume that the raw materials of self-reproduction (N in (1), (2))
comprises generic substrates only. This over-stringent assumption rules out
the realistic situation that they contain other organisms; but it is acceptable
for present purposes because if accurate self-reproduction and replication are
allowed under these over-stringent requirements, so are they when the generic
(7)Thus, quantum theory is no-design in this sense: the initial state of the universe is a
uniform, low entropy state; the elementary interactions allowed in quantum theory do not
contain the design of biological adaptations.
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resources contain also living organisms.
Before presenting the argument, I shall recall the basics of the constructor
theory of information (section 2.1). This is crucial to give an exact charac-
terisation of what it means for the laws of physics to allow information to be
physically instantiated.
2.1 Information
Replication when regarded as copying is intimately connected with informa-
tion. This has inspired some information-based approaches to fundamental
problems in biology, [24]. Until recently, information had no place in fun-
damental physics: expressions such as “information being instantiated in a
physical system” were inherently approximate, or fuzzy. But the constructor
theory of information has now incorporated information within fundamental
physics, [17], providing an exact, physical characterisation to those expres-
sions, as follows.
A set of attributes Σ is an information variable [17] if the task of per-
forming any permutation over Σ (allowing for waste), and the replication
task over Σ, as in (1), are all possible. The attributes of an information
variables are called information attributes. An information medium is
a substrate some of whose attributes constitute an information variable.
Information media must obey the interoperability principle [17]: the com-
posite system of two information media with information variables Σ1 and
Σ2, is an information medium with information variable Σ1 × Σ2. This is a
physical principle: it requires there to be interactions such that information
is “copiable” from one information medium to any other.
Thus, whether or not information media exist, i.e., whether or not informa-
tion can be instantiated in physical systems, depends on the laws of physics.
The intuition about replication being central to information is now expressed
as a physical law: laws of physics permitting information media must allow
information variables - i.e., replicable sets of attributes as in (1).
A physical system M instantiates information if it is an information medium
in one of its information attributes (belonging to some information variable
Σ) and that the task of giving it any other attribute in Σ (allowing for waste)
is possible. This is an exact physical requirement: for this to be possible,
certain interactions must be available in nature. It is also an intrinsic, coun-
terfactual, property of M.
A constructor C for the replication task on some information variable Σ
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(X,N)
C
=⇒ (X,X,W ) , ∀X ∈ Σ
is called a copier of Σ.
Of its substrates, one - the target - is changed from having the attribute N
to having the attribute (X,W ); the other - the source, initially having one
of the attributes X in Σ, to be replicated - remains unchanged (but it may
change temporarily during the copy process).
Therefore (by definition of a constructor) C and the source substrate with
the attribute X constitute a constructor C[X] performing the task TX =
{N → (X,W )} on the target. The information attribute X in the source
acts as a constructor, instructing C to perform the task TX on N . See the
figure 2.1.
C 
X X 
X N 
N X C[X] 
Figure 1: Two equivalent representations of a copier C (waste W omitted). On
the left, C is a constructor with two substrates (represented by lines): the source,
that remains unchanged; and the target, that is changed. On the right, C and the
source substrate with the attributes X constitute the constructor C[X] performing
the task TX = {N → X} on the target, for all X ∈ Σ. The copier is a simple
example of a programmable constructor.
In general, a programmable constructor is a constructor V that has,
among its input substrates, an information medium M that can have any of
the attributes P in an information variable, with the property that M with
any of those information attributes is itself a constructor. The information
instantiated in M is an abstract constructor - an instance of “information
with causal power”, [25]. V [P ] is a constructor for the task TP , P is the
program for the task TP and TP is in the repertoire of V . For example, V
could be the ribosome, P the sequence that, when inserted in V , would cause
V to perform the task TP of constructing a particular polypeptide chain.
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3 The theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion is compatible with no-design laws
I shall now show that under no-design laws accurate self-reproducers and
accurate replicators are not forbidden, provided only that the laws permit the
existence of information media (and enough resources). This will vindicate
that the theory of evolution by natural selection is compatible with those
laws (and thus, in particular, with the current theories of physics).
My argument includes three steps. First I establish that an accurate con-
structor for a generic task is compatible with no-design laws (section 3.1),
provided that it contains a replicator, instantiating a recipe for that task.
As a special case, I show that accurate self-reproducers are compatible with
no-design laws (section 3.2), provided that they implement the “replicator-
vehicle” logic; it follows that so are accurate replicators, and that they require
there to be a self-reproducer. Finally I show that the logic of natural selection
is compatible with no-design laws (section 3.3).
3.1 An accurate constructor must contain a replicator
A task T being possible means that for any given accuracy (short of per-
fection) the laws of physics permit an approximate constructor capable of
performing the task to that accuracy.
Consider a possible, non elementary task T and an object F that can perform
T to a high accuracy (8) . For instance, T could be the task of constructing
a car from generic substrates and F a generalised car factory, including all
the processes converting raw materials such as iron, etc., into a car.
The approximate constructor F executes a procedure - a recipe - to perform
the task T to accuracy . I will show that F must include a replicator and
a programmable constructor; and that the recipe must have a hierarchical
structure and be instantiated in the replicator.
No-design laws contain no good constructor for T , such as F - neither in
the elementary interactions, nor in the generic resources. Hence the recipe
used by F to perform T must be decomposable into steps (not necessarily
sequential) that are allowed by no-design laws. That is to say, sub-recipes -
procedures to perform sub-tasks that are executed by sub-constructors con-
tained in F . To avoid infinite regress, two conditions must be fulfilled.
(8)It is the subsidiary theory that provides specific measures of accuracy.
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One is that the subtasks be non-specific to T . For instance, when T is the
task of constructing a car, the subtasks are those of constructing sub-parts
of the car - e.g., door handles, windows, etc. Hence, the constructor F must
include two parts: One – which I call V – performs T blindly, i.e., subtask
by subtask, and it is non-specific to T , because so are the subtasks. The
rest of F – which I call P – is specific to T and instantiates the recipe for
T : it specifies the sequence of the subtasks, thus controlling V . Hence F
can be described as a programmable constructor, V , programmed with a
program P having the same logic as the recipe: it has a modular structure
P = (p1, p2, · · · , pN) where each instruction pi takes values in an information
variable and tells V which sub-task to perform, when, on the substrates(9).
V is non-specific to T because it must also be capable of executing other
programs - different combinations of the elementary units pi. For example, a
car factory contains robots executing sub-recipes to construct the car’s doors.
These robots contain sub-robots to construct handles, windows, etc., which
could be used to construct other objects than cars.
The other condition is obtained by applying the same reasoning recursively
to the subtasks. If they, too, are non-elementary, they require a recipe that
is decomposable into non-specific sub-recipes. The base for the recursion
- for T to be performable to that particular accuracy - is provided by the
elementary sub-recipes of the recipe for T being elementary tasks - which
can be performed by (approximations to) constructors that are available in
nature, as generic resources.
Note that these elementary sub-tasks need not be specified in the recipe:
they are implicit in the laws of physics. For instance, the elementary steps in
the car recipe are tasks like, say, “oxidise the aluminium coating”, and occur
simply by leaving the substrate exposed to air.
Under no-design laws, any (approximation to a) constructor wears out after
a finite time. Therefore F , to perform the task T to the accuracy , must
undergo a process of maintenance, defined as one whereby a new instance
of F - i.e., of P and V - is brought about, from generic materials, before the
former one stops working. In the case of the car factory, this is achieved by
replacing old subparts of the robots, assembly lines, etc. and by preserving
the programs they run.
To avoid an infinite regress, implementing the maintenance must not in turn
require the recipe P for T . Also, the design of the recipe P cannot be in the
(9)This is a schematic representation: P need not have a linear structure.
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laws of physics. Thus, the only other possibility is that the new instance of P
is brought about by blind replication of the recipe P contained in the former
instance - i.e., by replicating its subunits pi (that are non-specific to T ). We
conclude that, under no-design laws, the substrate instantiating the recipe
is necessarily a modular replicator: a physical object that can be copied
blindly, an elementary subunit at a time. In contrast, V - the non-specific
component of F - is constructed anew from generic resources.
Moreover, under no-design laws errors can occur: thus, to achieve high and
improvable accuracy, the recipe must include error-correction. In the car
factory, this includes, say, controlling the functionalities of the subcompo-
nents (e.g., fine checks on the position of doors, wheels, etc.). Hence the
recipe P must contain information about the task T , informing the criterion
for error detection and correction.
The information in the recipe is an abstract constructor that I shall call
knowledge (without a knowing subject [26]). Knowledge has an exact char-
acterisation in constructor theory: it is information that can act as a con-
structor and cause itself to remain instantiated in physical substrates.
Crucially, error-correcting the replication is necessary. Hence the subunits pi
must assume values in a discrete (digital) information variable: one whose
attributes are separated by non-allowed attributes. For, if all values in a
continuum were allowed, error-correction would be logically impossible.
3.1.1 Appearance of design
Something with the appearance of design is often described as “improbable”
[27, 28]. This is misleading because probability measures are multiplicative;
so that would mean that two independent objects with the appearance of
design would have much more of that appearance than they do separately.
But that is not the case when the two objects have unrelated functionalities
(such as, say, internal organs of different organisms). In contrast, two organs
in the context of the same organism, coordinating to the effect of gene prop-
agation, do have a greater appearance of design than either separately. This
can be expressed naturally in constructor-theoretic terms for programmable
constructors.
Consider a recipe R for a possible task T . A sub-recipe R′ for the task T ′
is fine-tuned to perform T if almost any slight change in T ′ would cause
T to be performed to a much lower accuracy. (For instance, changing the
mechanism of insulin production in the pancreas even slightly, would impair
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the overall task the organism performs.) A programmable constructor V
whose repertoire includes T has the appearance of design if it can execute
a recipe for T with a hierarchical structure including several, different sub-
recipes, fine-tuned to perform T . Each fine-tuned sub-recipe is performed
by a sub-constructor contained in V : the number of fine-tuned sub-recipes
performable by V is a measure of V ’s appearance of design. This constructor-
theoretic definition is non-multiplicative, as desired.
3.2 The logic of self-reproduction
I shall now apply the results of section 3.1 to self-reproduction, to conclude
that no-design laws permit an accurate self-reproducer, provided that it op-
erates via what I call, adapting Dawkins’ terminology [7], the replicator-
vehicle logic.
A self-reproducer S (of the kind (2)) is a constructor for its own construction,
from generic resources only. From the argument in 3.1 it follows that for S
to be a good approximation to a constructor for another S, it must consist
of: a modular replicator, R = (r1, r2, . . . , rn), instantiating the recipe for
S (the elementary units ri have attributes in an information variable Σ,
corresponding to instructions); a programmable constructor, the vehicle V ,
executing the recipe blindly, i.e., implementing non-specific sub-tasks.
The recipe instantiated by the replicator R must contain all the knowledge
about how to construct S, specifying a procedure for its construction. Note,
however, that the recipe is in one sense incomplete: as remarked in sec-
tion 3.1, the recipe is not required to include instructions for the elementary
tasks, which occur spontaneously in nature. These are indeed relied upon
during actual cell development - they constitute epigenetics and environ-
mental context. As remarked by George C. Williams, “Organisms, wherever
possible, delegate jobs to useful spontaneous processes, much as a builder
may temporarily let gravity hold things in place and let the wind disperse
paint fumes”, [29].
Under no-design laws, maintenance and error-correction are necessary for a
high and improvable accuracy to be achieved; and in self-reproduction, cru-
cially, it must be S only that brings about the new instance of S. Therefore,
since the maintenance cannot be performed by the laws of physics either, be-
cause of the no-design conditions, it must be executed by S. As in the general
case of section 3.1, maintenance must be achieved via copying the recipe and
constructing the vehicle V . These are enacted, respectively, by two sub-
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constructors in the vehicle, C and B, which implement the replicator-vehicle
logic that von Neumann discovered, [15].
In the construction phase B executes R to construct a new vehicle V :
N
B[R]
=⇒ (V,W ) .
In bacteria B includes the mechanisms for constructing the daughter cell,
such as the ribosome which uses DNA instructions (translated into RNA) to
construct proteins. Blind error-correction is possible via checks on the sub-
tasks of the recipe; however, construction errors are not propagated, because
the new vehicle is the result of executing the recipe in the replicator, not a
copy of the former vehicle.
In the copy phase, the blind replication of R is performed by C, a copier
of the information variable Σ:
(R,N)
C
=⇒ (R,R,W ) . (3)
This happens by replicating the configuration of R blindly, one elementary
unit at a time. It follows that C is a universal copier for the set of replicators
consisting of elementary units drawn from Σ (a property called heredity [32]).
Error-correction can happen blindly too, for instance via mismatch-repair.
In bacteria this phase is DNA replication and C includes all the relevant
enzymes in the cell. (10) For the two phases to perform maintenance, the
recipe for the vehicle V , instantiated in the replicator R, must be copied in
the copy-phase. This requires the elementary instructions of the recipe to be
(sets of) the elementary units ri of the replicator. In bacteria they are the
codons - triplets of the elementary units of the replicator (the nucleotides),
coding for the building blocks of proteins (aminoacids).
The replication of each sub-unit ri constitutes a measurement of which at-
tribute ri holds, followed by constructing a new instance of it. Since the
replicator R must contain all the knowledge about S, the attributes in Σ,
of which R is made, must be generic resources, so as to require no recipe
(other than R) to be constructed from generic resources. I call a modular
replicator such as R whose subunits are made of generic resources a tem-
plate replicator. A DNA strand is one: the information variable Σ is the
set of nucleotides - they are simple enough to have been naturally occurring
in pre-biological environments.
(10)I do not model details irrelevant to the self-reproduction logic (e.g. DNA semi-
conservative replication).
16
We thus see that the two maintenance phases achieve self-reproduction, as
they amount to bringing about a new R, by copying the former R, and a
new V , by construction - controlled by R. Thus, self-reproduction is stable
precisely because copying and construction automatically execute the main-
tenance of S, by replicating the recipe and re-constructing the vehicle before
the former instance of S wears out; and they permit error-correction. For ar-
bitrarily high accuracy, both phases implement elementary sub-recipes that
are non-specific to self-reproducers, and do not bear design. Therefore ar-
bitrarily accurate self-reproduction is permitted by no-design laws, provided
that the latter allow replicators - i.e., information media.
Rewriting the copy phase, (3), as
N
C[R]
=⇒ (R,W ) ,
to highlight that C executes R, we see that a template replicator has a
special property. It instantiates a recipe for its own construction from generic
resources only (C does not need to contain any additional recipe to construct
the subunits of R: it blindly copies the pattern, subunit by subunit; and the
units are generic resources). This is unique to template replicators. No other
object could be a recipe for the construction of itself to a high accuracy. For
the argument in section 3.1 implies that an instance (or a blueprint) of an
object is not, in general, a recipe for its construction from generic substrates.
A 3-D raster-scanner provided with an instance of, say, a bacterium could
not re-produce it accurately from generic substrates only: without a recipe
containing the knowledge about the bacterium’s structure, there would be no
criterion for error-correction, resulting in a bound on the achievable accuracy.
Likewise, an entire organism could not self-reproduce to a high accuracy
via self-copying: without the recipe informing error-correction, an “error
catastrophe” [30] would occur. This also provides a unifying descriptions of
the two phases: the replicator R is a recipe for another instance of itself,
when instructing C; a recipe for the construction of another vehicle, when
instructing B. Overall, it instantiates the full recipe for S - see the figure
3.2.
R is an active, germ line replicator [7], because instantiates all the knowledge
necessary to achieve its own replication. It is a consequence of the above argu-
ment that high-fidelity replication is possible under no-design laws too, pro-
vided that there is a vehicle that performs blind copying and error-correction.
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Figure 2: The logic of self-reproduction An accurate self-reproducer (top
of the figure) consists of the replicator R (blue outline) and the vehicle V (green
outline) - which contains the copier C and the constructor B. In the copy phase C
copies the replicator R - C[R] (red outline) acts as a constructor. In the construc-
tion phase B executes the recipe in R to build a vehicle from generic resources N
- B[R] (red outline) acts as a constructor. Finally (bottom) the copy of R and the
newly constructed vehicle form the offspring.
Moreover, for the replicator to preserve its ability to be an accurate replica-
tor across generations, its vehicle must be reproduced too - together, they
must constitute a self-reproducer. Hence self-reproduction is essential to
high-fidelity replication under no-design laws.
3.3 Natural selection is permitted under no-design laws
These conclusions imply that an accurate self-reproducer - together with
an accurate replicator - is permitted under no-design laws that allow for
information media. So, under such laws, it can be constructed from generic
resources only, given enough knowledge: it could continue to exist, say, had
a chemical lab created it.
However, one must also address the question: can accurate self-reproducers
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arise from generic resources only, under such laws?
Note that what the prevailing conception would aim to prove is that the
emergence of accurate self-reproducers follows (with some probability) given
certain initial conditions and laws of motion. This approach, informing the
search for viable models for the origin of life, [25], is suitable to solve scien-
tific problems such as predicting the existence of life elsewhere in the uni-
verse - e.g., by providing bounds to how probable the emergence of those
self-reproducers is on an earth-like planet. Here I am addressing a differ-
ent problem: whether accurate self-reproducers are possible under no-design
laws. This is a theoretical (indeed, constructor-theoretic) question and can
be addressed without resorting to predictions. Indeed, the theory of evolu-
tion provides a positive answer to that question, provided that two further
points are established. I shall argue for them in what follows.
The first point is that the logic of evolution by natural selection is com-
patible with no-design laws because - in short - selection and variation are
non-specific to its end products. This can be seen by modeling the logic
of natural selection as an approximate construction, whose substrates are
populations of replicators and whose (highly approximate) constructor is the
environment. This occurs over a much longer time-scale than that of self-
reproduction, whereby replicators - constructors on the shorter scale - become
now substrates.
Evolution relies upon populations being changed by variation and selection
over the time-scale spanning many generations. Crucially, the mutations in
the replicators, caused by the environment, are non-specific, (as in section
3.1), to the “end product” of evolution (as Dawkins put it, not “systemati-
cally directed to improvement” [27]). This constructor-theoretic characteri-
sation of mutations replaces the less precise locution “random mutations” (as
opposed to non-random selection, [5]). These mutations are all transmitted
to the successfully created individuals of the next generation, by heredity -
irrespective of their being harmful, neutral or beneficial in that particular
environment.
Selection emerges from the interaction between the replicators and the en-
vironment with finite resources. It may lead to equilibrium, given enough
time and energy. If so, the surviving replicators are near a local maximum
of effectiveness at being replicated in that environment.
Thus, the environment is passive and blind in this selection process. Since it
retains its ability to cause non-specific variation and passive selection again, it
qualifies as a naturally-occuring approximation to a constructor. Crucially,
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it is a crude approximation to a constructor: crude enough that it could
have arisen by chance and requires no explanation. Its actions - variations
and selection - require no design in laws of physics, as they proceed by non-
specific, elementary steps. So the logic of evolution by natural selection is
compatible with no-design laws of physics.
The second point is that natural selection, to get started, does not require
accurate self-reproducers with high-fidelity replicators. Indeed, the minimal
requirement for natural selection is that each kind of replicator produce at
least one viable offspring, on average, per lifetime - so that the different
kinds of replicators last long enough to be “selected” by the environment. In
challenging environments, a vehicle with many functionalities is needed to
meet this requirement. But in unchallenging ones (i.e. sufficiently unchang-
ing and resource-rich), the requirement is easily met by highly inaccurate
self-reproducers that not only have no appearance of design, but are so inac-
curate that they can have arisen spontaneously from generic resources under
no-design laws - as proposed, for instance, by the current theories of the
origin of life [11, 31]. For example, template replicators, such as short RNA
strands [32], or similar “naked” replicators (replicating with poor copying fi-
delity without a vehicle) would suffice to get natural selection started. Since
they bear no design, they require no further explanation - any more than
simple inorganic catalysts do.(11)
I conclude that the theory of evolution is compatible with no-design laws of
physics, that allow, in addition to enough time and energy, information me-
dia. These requirements do not contain the design of biological adaptations.
Hence, under such laws, the theory of evolution fully explains the appearance
of design in living organisms, without their being intentionally designed.
4 Self-reproduction under quantum theory
In this section I shall show that accurate self-reproduction is compatible with
quantum theory: after a critique of works claiming the opposite (section 4.1),
I demonstrate a quantum-mechanical (kinematical) model of the replicator-
vehicle logic (section 4.2).
(11)Metabolism-first conjectures such as Dyson’s, [10], based on evolution of molecules
“by random drift”, without template replicators, are thus bound by the present argument
to rely on elementary operations, compatible with no-design requirements.
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4.1 Irrelevance of the incompatibility arguments
The first claim that self-reproduction is incompatible with quantum physics
was made by Wigner [12]. Its agenda is to show that “the present laws
of quantum mechanics will have to undergo modifications before they can
be applied to the problems of life” and they need to be complemented by
“biotonic” laws, containing the design of self-reproducers [12]. The proposed
method to do that is showing that the unitary laws of quantum physics which
cause arbitrarily accurate self-reproduction of an organism S constitute a
vanishingly small fraction of all possible unitaries, when S is a sufficiently
specialised entity (has the appearance of design).
In Wigner’s model the substrates of self-reproduction consist of three parts:
the parent self-reproducer; the substrates to be transformed into the new
instance and the substrates to be transformed into waste. Correspondingly,
the total Hilbert is modelled as H˜ = H1 ⊗ H2 ⊗ H3, where the labels 1,2,3
refer, respectively, to those three parts, and H1 ∼ H2 (I shall denote both
by H). The “highly specialized” self-reproducer is a subspace WS ⊂ H
whose dimension h(S) is much smaller than the dimension d of H. Wigner’s
argument shows that the set of unitaries causing the replication of WS in a
given tensor-product structure
{U : ∃WS ⊂ H, ∃ |N〉 ∈ H ⊗H3 : WS ⊗ Span{|N〉} → WS ⊗WS ⊗H3}
has measure which tends to zero as h(S)
d
→ 0 (with respect to the natural
measure on the space of unitaries) [33].
Wigner concludes that unless the unitary U is “tailored so as to permit self-
reproduction, it is infinitely unlikely” that, under quantum theory, accurate
self-reproduction of specialised entities can occur; whence the need for de-
signed laws.
Evidently, this argument would not rule out self-reproduction only. It would
apply to all the unitaries U : WC ⊗ Span{|N〉} → WC ⊗WT ⊗H3 for some
subspaces WC , WT whose dimension is smaller than d. Hence it would rule
out, under Wigner’s interpretation, every specialised construction.
But the interpretation is erroneous. As explained, the “non-typical”interaction
is compatible with no-design laws (and in particular with quantum mechan-
ics, see section 4.2), because it can be decomposed into elementary steps -
non-specific to S - controlled by the recipe. No-design laws plus a knowledge-
laden recipe can play the role that Wigner erroneously assumed can only be
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played by knowledge-laden laws and a generic initial state. Also, the “diffi-
cult feat” [12] of bringing about the knowledge in the recipe does not require
intentional design, as explained by evolutionary theory, which I showed is
compatible with no-design laws of physics.
The misconception underlying Wigner’s interpretation is to identify the math-
ematical property of being a “non-typical” unitary with the physical property
of containing the design of an object. Evidently the former does not imply the
latter; so, the argument is irrelevant to the claim. Similarly, the (multiplica-
tive) property of belonging to a small subspace misrepresents the appearance
of design (which is non-multiplicative, see section 3.1.1).
Moreover, as pointed out in [33], Wigner’s argument is about an over-con-
strained set of unitaries, i.e., the ones causing reproduction of WS in a tensor-
product structure that is fixed a priori. But Wigner’s purpose is served by the
set of unitaries with the property that there exists a tensor product structure
in which they would cause self-reproduction. Nevertheless, Baez’s theorem,
[33], that almost all unitaries would achieve replication of a single state in the
presence of a specific initial state, in some tensor product structure, is not
actually a rebuttal of Wigner’s claim. One could reach the same conclusion
as Wigner’s by arguing that this initial condition is in fact of zero-measure
in the set of all possible initial conditions. Also, the replication of a single
quantum state (which Wigner also discusses) is too strict a requirement to
model self-reproduction of living entities, as it does not permit evolution.
Confusing self-reproduction and replication (cloning) of single quantum states
has informed another claim, that self-reproduction of a universal constructor
with finite resources is forbidden by quantum theory [20, 21, 22]. The model
supporting this claim comprises a collection of substrates, with Hilbert space
K, n of which are the raw materials, |0〉 ∈ K; the rest contains the processor,
the control unit and the program space of the alleged universal constructor.
|ψ〉 ∈ Km−1 is any state of the processor and |Pψ〉 ∈ K : |Pψ〉 |0〉 → |Pψ〉 |ψ〉 is
the program for the state |ψ〉. Self-reproduction of the universal constructor
would correspond to a unitary satisfying, for some states |C〉, |C∗〉 of the
control unit:
L(|ψ〉 |Pψ〉 |0〉⊗m |C〉) |0〉⊗n−m = |ψ〉 |Pψ〉L(|ψ〉 |Pψ〉 |0〉⊗m |C∗〉) |0〉⊗n−2m ,
for every ψ. This is impossible, the argument goes, unless programs for differ-
ent states are orthogonal; in which case (allegedly) infinitely many resources
would be needed, as the program space would have to be infinite-dimensional.
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This claim, too, is irrelevant to whether living self-reproducers are compatible
with quantum mechanics. L copies each state of the vehicle and the program
for that state, while actual self-reproduction requires the re-production of a
subspace - the property of being a self-reproducer. Indeed, L is ruled out by
the no-cloning theorem, if the programs are not orthogonal. Besides, actual
self-reproducers need not be universal constructors: their repertoire need
only include (and, in the earth’s biosphere, does include) very few products,
compared with the set of all possible products.
4.2 The replicator-vehicle logic under quantum theory
I shall now demonstrate a quantum-mechanical model of self-reproduction,
implementing the replicator-vehicle logic. I model the world as a collection
of replicas of the substrates that can have the attribute of being a self-
reproducer. Each substrate has Hilbert space H = Hr⊗Hv, where Hr is the
space of the replicator and Hv that of the vehicle. One replica contains the
parent, one its offspring, and the remaining w are transformed into waste
products. The law of motion is a unitary U which I shall prove to be com-
patible with self-reproduction. The attribute A is the +1-eigenspace of the
projector Aˆ for holding that attribute: A = {|ψ〉 : Aˆ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉}.
Let Nˆ = Nˆr ⊗ Nˆv (defined on Hr ⊗ Hv) be the projector for being generic
substrates and Sˆ = Rˆs ⊗ Vˆs be that for being a self-reproducer S, where Vˆs
is the projector (defined on Hv) for being a vehicle and Rˆs is the projector
(defined on Hr) for being a recipe for it.
For evolution to be possible a set Σ of different self-reproducers must be
allowed in the environment N . So, the unitary law of motion U must satisfy,
∀s, s′ ∈ Σ:
U : Rs′ ⊗ Vs ⊗N⊗(w+1) → Rs′ ⊗ Vs ⊗Rs′ ⊗ Vs′ ⊗H⊗w . (4)
This is self-reproduction as in equation (2) (for s = s′); and each self-
reproducer has heredity: a vehicle copies any recipe (coding for vehicles
or not); and executes recipes to construct any other vehicle. Different vehi-
cles are represented by mutually orthogonal projectors. By unitarity of (4),
recipes for different self-reproducers are orthogonal too: RˆsRˆs′ = 0. I shall
confine attention to a basis of orthogonal programs spanning each subspace
(their superpositions code, by linearity, for the same vehicle).
That the environment contains no knowledge about the self-reproducer is
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guaranteed by imposing the (sufficient) conditions RˆsNˆr = 0, VˆsNˆv = 0, for
all s.
Let hAˆ be the rank of the projector Aˆ, dr the dimension of Hr, dv that of Hv.
Each self-reproducer occupies a small volume of the space of all possible states
of a system, whereby hRˆs  dr, hVˆs  dv. So do generic resources, being
a collection of low-entropy, low-entanglement states: therefore, hNˆr  dr,
hNˆv  dv. Thus the condition in (4) can be met by many unitaries, because
hRˆs′hVˆs(hNˆrhNˆv)
w+1  h2
Rˆs′
hVˆshVˆs′ (drdv)
w , ∀s, s′ ∈ Σ .
Each unitary permitting self-reproduction is the serial composition of one
implementing the copy phase and one implementing the construction phase.
Without loss of generality, I adopt a qubit model, where the replicator con-
sists of r qubits and the vehicle of v qubits. The information variable Σb
representing the elementary replicator units comprises, say, the z-component
eigenvectors of a single qubit. I model generic resources as a fixed input
state from N , say the simultaneous +1-eigenvector of the z-components
of the qubits in Hw+1 (having the desired features of low-entropy and no-
entanglement).
The copy unitary C (replicating the recipe) must satisfy:
C : Rs′ ⊗Nr ⊗ Vs ⊗N⊗wr → Rs′ ⊗Rs′ ⊗ Vs ⊗H⊗wr , ∀s, s′ ∈ Σ
This is realised as a sequence of CNOT i,j from qubit i in the parent’s repli-
cator subspace Hr to the qubit j of the new instance’s, performed in the
presence of any vehicle:
C =
r∏
i=1
CNOT i,i+r ⊗
∑
s
Vs +Wc ⊗ (id−
∑
s
Vs)
where the unitary Wc occurs if no vehicle is available. (A possible error-
correction process, controlled by the program, is not modeled here.)
The construction unitary B must satisfy:
B : Rs′ ⊗ Vs ⊗N⊗(w+1)v → Rs′ ⊗ Vs ⊗ Vs′ ⊗H⊗wv , ∀s, s′ ∈ Σ
which can be realised by the unitary
B =
∑
s∈Σ
Rs ⊗ Us +
(
id−
∑
s∈Σ
Rs
)
⊗Wb .
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Here, any vehicle executes the recipe Rs to construct a new vehicle Vs, via
Us =
∑
s Vs⊗Bs + (id−
∑
s Vs)⊗ W˜b where the unitary Bs is the construc-
tion of a new instance of the vehicle (possibly including error-correction):
Bs : N
⊗(w+1)
v → Vs ⊗ H⊗wv . The arbitrary unitaries W˜b and Wb express,
respectively, the output in the absence of a vehicle and of a program coding
for a vehicle.
Under quantum theory Us is decomposable into elementary operations, con-
ditioned on groups of qubits in the replicator: it is controlled by the recipe
only. It can be implemented without the design of Vs being encoded in the
underlying laws. In addition, (by universality) a decomposition into ele-
mentary (coherent) quantum gates is allowed. Whether quantum coherence
could actually be used, either in living or in artificial self-reproducers, e.g.
to enhance the construction efficiency, is an open question in quantum bi-
ology, [34]. But I have just shown that this possibility is allowed. Hence
self-reproduction is compatible with quantum theory: it can be implemented
and stabilised via elementary operations requiring no design, as promised.
5 Conclusion
I have proved that the physical processes the theory of evolution relies upon
are possible under no-design laws, provided that the latter allow for infor-
mation media (and enough generic resources). Under such laws, accurate
self-reproduction can occur, but only via von Neumann’s replicator-vehicle
logic; and a high fidelity replicator requires an accurate self-reproducer. My
argument also highlights that all accurate constructors, under such laws,
must contain knowledge - a special abstract constructor - in the form of a
recipe, instantiated in a replicator.
I have also extended von Neumann’s model of the logic of self-reproduction
to quantum theory. This informs further investigations of quantum effects in
natural and artificial self-reproducers. Constructor theory has also expressed
exactly within fundamental physics, the logic of self-reproduction, replica-
tion, and natural selection, and the appearance of design. This has promise
for a deep unification in our understanding of life and physics.
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